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Is the Kerala Model Sustainable? Lessons from the Past
by Richard W. Franke and Barbara H. Chasin
Proposed for presentation at the
International Conference on Kerala's Development Experience:
National and Global Dimensions
9-11 December, 1996
New Delhi
Sponsored by the
Institute of Social Sciences
B-7 Extn. 18, Safdarjung Enclave
New Delhi 110029, India
and held at the
India International Centre
40 Max Mueller Marg
New Delhi 110003
Is the Kerala Model sustainable? To answer this question, several
others must be posed:
1. What do we mean by sustainability?
2. What is the Model that is to be sustained?
3. What forces brought the Model into being?
4. Why is the question of sustainability being asked?
5. What are the principal forces threatening the Model's sustain-
ability?
6. What resources are available to sustain the Model? Can the
forces that created the Model in the first place be used to sustain
it, or will new forces be necessary?
To attempt an answer to these several question we will propose a
formal definition of sustainability and of the Kerala Model. We shall
then elaborate the definition of the Kerala Model to identify those
elements that are most critical to the question of sustainability.
This will be followed by a consideration of the Model's major failures
and shortcomings that threaten its sustainability -- The Crisis of the
Kerala Model. The present world political and economic structure
favors models based on private accumulation and growing inequality
over Kerala's emphasis on public services and egalitarian ideals. Can
the Kerala Model be sustained in such circumstances? Out of the
complex present-day conjuncture of events and processes, Kerala's
activists and intellectuals have fashioned the elements of a New
Kerala Model based on decentralization and high levels of local par-
ticipation. Can the New Kerala Model preserve what is best from the
old? Can it overcome the major failures of the old model? Can it
foster local structures strong enough to survive in the hostile world
of international capitalism? Can it lead to meaningful environmental
preservation? Can it empower people to achieve these difficult goals
just as they once achieved public services and redistribution of
wealth? Will the new Kerala Model be sustainable?
1.Sustainability
Sustainability is one of the most widely discussed concepts in the
developed world at present.1 Most proponents see it primarily in
ecological terms. We suggest a broader conceptualization. A develop-
ment model is sustainable to the extent that it:
Improves or at least maintains the material quality of
life of the population.
Expands or at least maintains access to any entitlements
necessary for economic security and personal dignity,
particularly of vulnerable groups.
Expands or at least maintains the number of people ob-
taining access to production resources adequate for a
decent life or employment at reasonable wages.
Reduces the level of social and economic inequalities, or
at least does not exacerbate them.
Expands or at least maintains basic political and indi-
vidual rights.
Improves or at least maintains productive resources
including land, water, flora and fauna.2
For many years the Kerala Model has met most of these criteria. Few
models elsewhere have come so close to fulfilling all the demands of
sustainability. This results from the features of the Kerala Model.
2.The Kerala Model
We define the Kerala Model as:
2.1A set of high material quality of life indicators coinciding
with low per capita incomes, both distributed across nearly the entire
population of Kerala.
2.2A set of wealth and resource redistribution programs that have
largely brought about the high material quality of life indicators.
2.3High levels of political participation and activism among ordi-
nary people along with substantial numbers of dedicated leaders at all
levels. Kerala's mass activism and committed cadre were able to
function within a largely democratic structure which the activism has
served to reinforce.
3.Quality of Life Indicators
The most obvious component of the Kerala Model is the set of statis-
tical quality of life indicators putting Kerala closer to high-income
developed countries than to its counterparts in the low-income world.
The most recent figures we could locate are mostly from 1993 and
reflect Kerala's continuing success. These are shown on Table 1.
Table 1
Comparison of Quality of Life Indicators, 1993
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Low-Income United
Indicator Kerala India Countriesa States
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Per capita GNP
($) b180 b300 300 24,740
Adult literacy
rate (%) c91 48 51 96
Life expectancy
in years d69 61 56 76
d73
Infant mortality
per 1,000 13 80 89 9
Birth rate
per 1,000 17 29 40 16
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sources: GOK 1995:3,21; Bose 1991; World Bank 1995:162-63,212-15.
Notes:
a Low-income refers in 1993 to 45 economies with per capita GNP of
$635 or less. With China and India excluded, it refers to 43 countries,
almost the same as the 37 countries used in Franke and Chasin 1989:11
for 1986 data and the 38 countries used in Franke and Chasin 1994:ii
for 1991 data.
b We estimated the $ figure for Kerala by multiplying the State Gover-
nment's 1993 figure of Rs 6,009 (GOK 1995:3) by 30, the approximate
number of rupees per dollar over the past 3 years. Based on the
World Bank (1995:162) estimate of $300 for India nationally in 1993, this
implies a 1993 all-India per capita income of Rs 9,000.
c Kerala's adult literacy rate for 1991 is taken from the 1991 Indian
Census, prior to the literacy campaign. By the end of 1991, Kerala's
rate was near 100%, but weaknesses in the follow-up may have reduced
the rate again to nearly 91%.
d We could not locate a combined life expectancy figure for Kerala.
The figure 69 is for men in 1991. The figure 73 is for women for 1993
(Alexander 1994).
It is important to emphasize Kerala's continuing lead among low-
income areas and the rest of India. Recent criticisms of the Kerala
Model suggest that Kerala is losing its lead within India. K. K.
George (1993:119) cites figures indicating that Punjab now spends more
per capita on education and that both Rajasthan and Punjab now spend
more per capita on health than Kerala. He also compares Kerala unfa-
vorably with Maharashtra, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Nagaland, Rajas-
than, and Uttar Pradesh in pension payments to destitutes. These
weaknesses should not be overlooked, but they remain minor compared
with Kerala's continuing overall ability to deliver a high basic
material quality of life to its people as the indicators show.
It is also important to note that Kerala's performance on the basic
indicators has continued to improve since the early 1980s. Generally,
the rest of India, and the low-income countries have made only slug-
gish progress. Kerala's infant mortality rate dropped from 27 in 1986
(Franke and Chasin 1989:11) to 13 in 1993 (see table 1). This is a
52% drop. By contrast, the all-India rate appears to have gone from
86 in 1986 to 80 in 1993, a decline of only 7%. The closest Indian
state to Kerala was Punjab, with an IMR in 1992 of 56 (GOK 1995:S14),
more than 4 times the 1993 Kerala rate. Furthermore, Kerala continues
to maintain a nearly even distribution of its indicators when compared
with the rest of India. The all-India IMR for 1992 was 53 for urban
areas versus 85 for rural areas, a 38% difference. For Punjab the
rural figure was 60 versus 41 for the cities, a 32% difference. In
Kerala, the rural rate of 17 contrasted only with an urban rate of 13,
a 23% difference (computed from GOK 1995:S14). Birth rates show
similar patterns.
What is the significance of Kerala's continuing ability to improve
literacy, birth rates, infant mortality, and life expectancy? It
means simply this: the Kerala Model is still valid and relevant as an
alternative to growth-only development strategies. Despite the many
problems the model faces, it seems to continue to function, even in
times of crisis. This important fact should not be overlooked when
assessing the sustainability of the Kerala Model.
4.Redistribution Programs: Case Study of Nadur Village
Behind Kerala's statistical indicators lies a century-long process
of struggle for redistribution of wealth and the expansion of public
services that would benefit most people rather than a small elite. In
1986-87, we conducted a research in the central Kerala village of
Nadur ("Centreville") to ascertain the effects of these struggles at
the local level. Our first goal was to assess the effects of the land
reform.
Nadur village has many typical features of Kerala, historically,
geographically, and sociologically. Nadur lies in the former princely
state of Cochin. In terms of land reforms, Cochin lies between the
former princely state of Travancore, now southern Kerala in which many
changes took place in the 19th century, and Malabar, now northern
Kerala, where the most protracted and bitter land struggles occurred.
Nadur was the scene neither of intense battles between tenants and
landlords in past decades nor of land occupations by radical peasant
groups in the late 1960s as took place in some other villages. At the
same time, Nadur has had its share of land reform militants and Com-
munist organizers so that it represents a kind of mid-way point in
terms of land reform struggles in Kerala.
Geographically Nadur is in the lower foothills of the Western Ghat
Mountains and contains intensive wet-rice paddy fields typical of the
lowland areas of Kerala, as well as cashew and coconut garden and
hillside fields more common in the central midlands. It also contains
some upland rubber and forest lands more like the parts of Kerala in
the higher elevations to the east. In both history and geography
Nadur is thus in the middle of the range of types found in Kerala.
Nadur's 5,000 plus residents include representative numbers of all
the major castes of Kerala except the Christians. Like many Cochin
villages, Nadur has a higher than average percentage of Nambudiri
Brahmins, one of the most important landlord groups in Kerala. It
also has Nair caste members in several occupations, craft castes,
Ezhavas, and Pulayas. The Nadur sample in 1987 contained only 2
households with workers sending large remittances from the Persian
Gulf states. Large outside remittances might overwhelm statistical
effects of the land reform. Nadur's near absence of such households
makes it a controlled case in which the redistribution of the land
reform should show up more clearly than in those areas where remit-
tances have flooded the village economy.
4.1 The Field Research
Nadur had been studied by Professor Joan Mencher who kindly made
available to us copies of her 1971 household survey. Although the
Kerala land reform was enacted in 1969 and went into effect in 1971,
land titles in 1971 were still held by landlords and several house-
holds were paying rent. The 1971 survey, with a few assumptions, can
be taken as pre-land reform, while our 1986-87 survey describes the
situation 15-16 years later, after all land reform transfers had been
completed. By comparing the two surveys we can describe how the land
reform affected land ownership, income distribution by caste and
class, and upward and downward income mobility of selected households.
In these ways, we can offer some insights into the achievements and
shortcomings of the reform.
Mencher's survey included 356 households of a census block used by
the Indian Census Bureau. The block is neither a whole village nor a
random sample. Administrative boundaries do not coincide with social
or geographic units. But the Nadur census block includes many of
Kerala's major caste and class groups who live in close proximity and
who shared the kinds of landlord/tenant/farm laborer relationships
which the land reform was intended to alter.
We studied a 1986-87 subset of 170 households from the 356 house-
holds studied in 1971. Caste ratios were held constant across the two
surveys.
4.2 The Findings
In the Nadur sample, abolition of rice land tenancy resulted in the
transfer of 52.25 acres of land from 10 large landlords (6% of the
sample) to 47 tenants (29% of the sample) who became fully entitled
small holders. The former tenants received on average 74 cents each.
One hundred and three landless households (64%) were not affected by
the rice land reform.3
The abolition of house compound tenancy benefited 92% of households.
Rights to 47.87 acres were transferred from 7 households (4%) to 156
households (92%). The average tenancy in 1971 was 51 cents while the
average owned in 1987 was 54 cents. The poorest laboring families
gained title only to small and often inferior plots. Overall, rents
and interest dropped from 7% of total sample income in 1971 to 1% in
1987 (Franke 1993:110).
Declining Land and Income Inequality? We used the Gini Index to
measure inequality. A decline in the Index means a decline in ine-
quality. In Nadur, the Gini Index for rice land ownership inequality
dropped 13 points. For house compound land, the Gini dropped 39
points between the two surveys. During the same 16 year period, the
Gini Index for income inequality declined by 5.3 points. Although
forces outside the land reform pulled both towards greater and less
inequality, land reform must have caused much of this decline in
income inequality. The 1974 Kerala Agricultural Workers' Protection
Act may also have played a role in these figures.
Declining Caste Inequality In Nadur, a reduction in caste inequali-
ty is one of the clearest consequences of the land reform. The Nambu-
diri Brahmin hold on land and high incomes was broken. In 1971 12
Nambudiri caste households had incomes that correlated 0.86 with rice
land and 0.89 with paramba owned. In 1987 the figures changed to
-0.09 and -0.19. Nambudiri incomes rose far less rapidly than those
of other castes. Nair and Mannan caste households gained the most
while the lowest caste Pulayas raised their relative position slight-
ly. Mannans and Pulayas probably gained more from programs other than
the land reform such as affirmative action. The political conditions
for these programs, however, included the power of tenants and their
allies in the land reform movement. Land reform struggles reinforced
the leverage for these lowest caste groups to move upwards economical-
ly.
Class Inequality. Nadur's class structure was altered dramatically
by the elimination of landlord and tenant classes. Former landlords
dropped from garnering 6.5 times the sample average income to 1.5
times the average. Former tenants did not gain much on average, but
several occupational groups slightly improved their economic position.
Professionals raised their share of income from 2.4 to 3.7 times the
sample average in the land reform period. Households depending pri-
marily on farming raised their relative share of income from 60% of
average to 90%. Land reform played an important but not determining
role in these class changes.
Social and Economic Mobility. In Nadur upward mobility occurred in
16 households that gained land but only one that lost land. Downward-
ly mobile households included 2 that lost land and 5 that gained.
Overall, changes in income levels correlated 0.19 with changes in rice
land ownership, and 0.21 with changes in house compound land. Both
associations are small but statistically significant. Many other
factors interacted with the reform. These include access to highly
paid wage labor, age and health of household head, number of wage
earners in the household, and access to reservation and targeted
development programs. Land reform in Nadur helped foster upward
mobility in conjunction with other social and economic processes.
Exploitation. One of the most effective components of Kerala's land
reform was to end the threat of eviction of tenants by their landlords
from either rice land or house compounds. The success of the land
reform, however, has produced new tensions. In place of the struggle
between tenants and landlords, former tenants are now at odds with
their hired agricultural laborers. Where once the poor were pitted
against the rich, now the poor are pitted against the slightly less
poor. This development may present an obstacle to progressive forces
in Kerala in rallying small landowners to their programs.4
Landlord Response to the Land Reform Nadur's Nambudiri caste land-
lord households adopted various strategies to prevent the land reform
from depriving them of high incomes and good futures for their child-
ren. Some sold land to tenants before the reform to acquire capital
for investment in other undertakings. All got their children into
higher education to make professional employment the chief landlord
response to the reform. This response has benefited Nadur because
formerly parasitic landlords have become teachers, administrators, and
small business people who contribute to the economy in ways their
ancestors did not. Kerala's high unemployment of the educated, howev-
er, threatens the former landlords' escape and could result in impov-
erishment for some.
4.3 Other Redistribution Programs in Nadur
Our Nadur study found that other Kerala programs also had measurable
effects. School and nursery lunches added 3% to the incomes of the
poorest households with children in school and raised their calorie
intake by 5%. The lunches improved the distribution of calories and
income by caste, class, income, and land ownership groups (Franke
1993a:360).
Nadur's ration shop effectively reduced income inequality by 5% in
1987, providing 10% more income for the bottom two quintiles which
include mostly labor and agricultural labor and low caste households.
The lunches and the ration shop became particularly important in July,
near the end of the long lean season before the August harvest. By
making available subsidized food, they probably reduced the need for
borrowing by many poor households. Even so, 11% of Nadur sample
households reported food shortages so severe that, at least once
during the reference year, they had to reduce food intake. Altogether
46% reported eating less, borrowing money or borrowing food at least
once in the year (Franke 1993:176).
Agricultural labor pensions played a small but significant role in
reducing inequality and bringing up the income levels of the poorest
groups. The research showed that 91% of Pulaya caste households
received at least one pension, and that the pensions raised the aver-
age incomes of all households receiving them by 17%. The ration shop,
school lunches, and agricultural labor pensions benefited female-
supported households more than male-supported households. They thus
contributed to reductions in one aspect of gender inequality (Franke
and Chasin 1996:628).
Literacy in Nadur went from 60% in 1971 to 74% in 1987. Among
members of the age cohort 15-29 years, the average years of schooling
was 8.1 for males and 7.6 for females. The age cohort 61+, by con-
trast, had below 2.5 years of school (Franke 1993:228). Every caste
and class group experienced increases in the percent literate and the
average years of education between 1971 and 1987. Muslims and Pulayas
experienced the greatest increase in years of education, thus tending
to improve their position vis a vis the other castes. The rate of
passing the SSLC also improved, but remained low, with only 14% of the
cohort 15-29 having passed. Those included 75% of Nambudiris but only
5% of Pulayas, 14% of Nairs, and no Nadur Muslims in that cohort in
the sample. The challenge for Nadur's educational system clearly
comes in creating conditions favorable to real school success those
groups most disadvantaged in the past. The Nadur sample displays the
same characteristics as have been noted in other parts of Kerala with
regard to education, late marriage, and declining birth rates. A
regression equation shows that after age has been controlled for, age
of marriage and years of education play statistically significant
roles in accounting for the number of births to females in the sample
(Franke 1993:239).
Overall, our research in Nadur strongly suggests that redistribution
has been beneficial to the lowest castes, lowest income groups, agri-
cultural laborers, and female-supported households. During the 16
year period between the 2 surveys, several poor households experienced
upward social mobility (Franke 1993:241-264). The percent of tiled
roofs went from 59% to 91%, and the average number of rooms per house
increased by one (Franke 1993:267). Electricity went from 8% to 23%
of houses and the economic advantage of electricity users dropped
(Franke 1993:270). Still, Nadur residents have few household furnish-
ings or consumer goods (Franke 1993:270-71). Only 22% had enough cots
for all household members; the average household income was Rs 6,871
($529), in 1987 (Franke 1993:112), an increase of about 10% over 1971
when adjusted for inflation. Most people remain very poor by interna-
tional standards.
4.4 Implications of the Nadur Study
Our evaluation of Kerala's redistribution programs in Nadur appears
to be the only local-level study of its kind. The research seems to
show that redistribution lies behind many of Kerala's material quality
of life indicators. As we noted above in the section on the statisti-
cal indicators component, when village-level redistribution is consid-
ered, the Kerala Model is still valid and relevant as an alternative
to growth-only development strategies.
5.Political Participation and Activism
We believe the Nadur study supports the contention that Kerala's
statistical indicators result from redistribution. But why has
redistribution occurred in Kerala? Enlightened nineteenth century
Maharajas provide part of the answer. Kerala's intense exposure to
Christian missions provide another part. We would argue, however,
that the main factor is Kerala's popular movements that have sustained
themselves for nearly a century.5 These movements have gone through
many stages, from caste improvement associations to trade unions and
peasant associations to Communist parties to the Kerala People's
Science Movement. Whatever the stage, popular movements in Kerala
have displayed a combination of characteristics that -- taken together
-- make them especially powerful and enduring:
5.1 Kerala's movements have often (though not always) contained very
large numbers of members overall. Kerala's activists have shown an
ability to mobilize very large numbers of people for a variety of
causes. In 1957 the membership of the Kerala Karshaka Sangham (Kerala
Peasant's Organization) reached 190,000 (Sathyamurthy 1985:189). With
just 3.5% of India's people, Kerala had 20% of all the unions in the
country (7,836) in 1984. Kerala's union membership accounted for 7.5%
of total Indian union membership (Thampy 1994:291). Left-oriented
unions appear to have a slight majority of the total membership in
Kerala (Thampy 1994:292-93). In 1983, 44% of workers in Kerala's
factory sector were trade union members (Thampy 1994:291). In 1988,
CPM-organized events in Alleppey involved 750,000 participants (Franke
and Chasin 1989/1994:27). The 1989-91 all-Kerala Total Literacy
Campaign recruited 350,000 teachers.
5.2 Kerala's movements have often achieved nearly total representa-
tion in strategic geographical or economic areas so that their in-
fluence far outweighed their total numbers. During the period 1935-
194, the All-Malabar Karshaka Sangham (Peasants' Organization) had a
paid up membership of 5,000 in Kasargod, and 10,000 in Chirakkal
(Sathyamurthy 1985:156). The Shertellai Coir Factory Workers Union in
1946 had 98% of the workers as members. Six other unions in the area
had above 80% membership (Kannan 1988:118). Similar concentrations
existed in recent years for toddy tappers in Thrissur (Kannan
1988:145-92) and agricultural laborers in Kuttanad and Palakkad
(Kannan 1988:249). Present-day workers at the Kerala Dinesh Beedi
Workers Cooperative in Kannur give about 70% of their votes to the
CPM-affiliated union, meaning that CITU can both dominate the elected
director boards and allow significant internal shop floor democracy
without losing its basic control (Isaac, Franke, and Raghavan 1997).
5.3Kerala's movements have often been very militant and creative in
finding ways to challenge authority.
The birth and success of Kerala Dinesh Beedi depended on the con-
centrated union membership, militancy, and history of mobilization of
the beedi workers, and the class solidarity of other workers who
became the cooperative's initial market (Isaac, Franke, and Raghavan
1997). The workers' creativity in sending out marketing teams to
other unions and to community organizations was matched by their
capacity to set aside party disputes and focus on the cooperative's
survival. In so doing, they may have laid a basis for the present-day
LDF approach of trying to free certain development activities from
interparty fighting. The KSSP in Kerala is known for its innovative
communication style that includes street theater, puppet plays, songs,
and an emphasis on making political struggle interesting to make it
more effective.
5.4 Kerala's movements have thrown up an unusually large number of
dedicated and self-sacrificing middle and top leaders, thereby creat-
ing a cadre structure of unusual strength, endurance, and ability to
generate new ideas and actions to adjust to changing local, national,
and even international circumstances. We propose the existence of
this factor without any clear empirical evidence. It seems unlikely
that movements with the features described above could sustain them-
selves for so long without a strong and viable cadre structure of
leaders who for the most part do not succumb to corruption and privi-
lege. The reasons for the initial appearance of this factor and its
sustainability in Kerala up to the present time would make for reward-
ing studies in history, social psychology, and organizational and
social movement theory.
Why did popular movements develop this set of characteristics in
Kerala? In our view, one of the most critical and compelling issues
in the historical study of Kerala would be to come up with a convinc-
ing explanation.
Some pieces of the puzzle may already be in place. We suggested in
our first book that Kerala's location might play a role. As a trans-
fer point on many ancient trading routes, Kerala has experienced
influences from many other cultures, for the most part peacefully.
This has led to a cosmopolitan outlook on the part of many of Kerala's
people, rendering them exceptionally open to ideas from outside, and
keenly aware of the possible value of such ideas (Franke and Chasin
1989/1994:23-25). Today, Kerala maintains national and international
ties of extraordinary strength: 50% of the gross output of the prim-
ary and secondary sectors of the economy is exported to other parts of
India and overseas, while around 65% of consumption expenditure goes
for imports (Isaac 1994:368). In the 1980s, over 682,000 of Kerala's
people worked overseas altogether(GOK 1988:12-13), with as many as
187,000 in the Gulf States in 1980 alone (Nair 1994:104), possibly
contributing as much as 19% to the state GDP in 1981 and remaining
above 12% through 1989 (Isaac 1992:24).
Based on ideas proposed by other researchers, we also advanced the
argument that Kerala's ecology might play a role. The mostly undif-
ferentiated access to water may have led to an evenly dispersed set-
tlement pattern that makes it easier to spread out water-borne bacte-
ria and parasites. This means Kerala starts with an advantage in
combating many infectious and parasite-driven diseases -- the main
diseases of underdeveloped areas. Another advantage is political:
rural and urban workers can more easily interact and support each
others' struggles. Furthermore, Kerala's elected progressive govern-
ments could more easily supply public services to a population fairly
evenly distributed: there were few special costs associated with
isolated, distant, politically unimportant groups (Franke and Chasin
1989/1994:22-23).6
Another probable factor is the set of historical conjunctures that
produced a modern rural proletariat in Kerala. Cool, well watered,
and close to ocean transport lanes, the Western Ghats were ideal for
tea and rubber plantations that British colonialists set up eagerly in
the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Coir mat-weaving factories,
cashew nut processing, tile factories, and sawmills were added. In a
parallel process, the supply of cheap labor in northern Malabar seems
to have stimulated the rise of beedi production under the direction of
Indian capitalists (Isaac, Franke, and Raghavan 1997).7 More intense-
ly than any other part of India, Kerala experienced a rupture of
traditional ties of kinship, caste, and locality with the potential
for class consciousness.8 The dissolution of traditional ties in
Kerala coincided with one of the most radicalizing periods of world
history: the Russian and Chinese revolutions, the class struggles in
Europe, and the independence movement in India and other Western
colonies. The combination of these several factors and their timing
may be part of the answer to Kerala's apparently unique constellation
of radical movements with such power and endurance.
6.The Crisis of the Kerala Model
Since the late 1970s, many scholars and activists within Kerala, and
a few from outside, have been sounding an alarm: the Kerala Model
faces several problems and shortcomings that, taken together, can be
called a crisis (Isaac and Tharakan 1995:1995). In 1990, the Economic
and Political Weekly devoted two issues to the theme Kerala Economy at
the Crossroads (EPW 25:35-36 and 37, 1 and 8 and 15 September 1990).
The Crisis of the Kerala Model was the major theme of the August 1994
First International Congress on Kerala Studies, held in Thiruvanantha-
puram. Hundreds of papers and discussions at the Congress reaffirmed
suspicions and elaborated on the nature of the problems Kerala faces.
In our view, the Crisis of the Kerala Model has 8 major components.
6.1 Kerala's SDP has grown at a much slower rate than the Indian
national average since the late 1970s (Isaac and Tharakan 1995:1995).
6.2 Stagnation in agricultural production until the late 1980s
coincided with a decline in the area planted in rice. This led to
increasing vulnerability to outside sources for the major food crop --
rice -- which was already substantially dependent on outside markets.
6.3 Escalation of prices for raw materials and competition from
cheaper labor sources in other areas have sent traditional industries
such as coir, cashew, and handloom into a tailspin (Isaac and Tharakan
1995:1995).
6.4 Industrial growth since the mid-1970s has been sluggish in
general and even negative in some years (Mohan 1994; Subrahmanian
1994; Isaac and Tharakan 1995:1995).
6.5Unemployment -- already high enough to be the major blight on
the Kerala Model -- has remained at about 3 times the all-India aver-
age (Prakash 1994:22; Isaac and Tharakan 1995:1996).
6.6 The state government has experienced a series of fiscal crises
that threaten to undermine many of the Kerala Model redistribution
programs (George 1993). Threatened programs include the agricultural
labor pensions, educational and health spending, and the public dis-
tribution system for food. The price of ration shop rice has been
rising relative to the open market price. Furthermore, subsidized
supplies are declining. In 1993, subsidized rice purchases declined
by 9% from their 1992 level (GOK 1994:21).9
6.7 Up to 15% of Kerala's people may have been left out of the
Model. These include fishing people (Karuna et al 1994; Kurien 1994),
female stone cutters (Ukkuru et al 1994), female domestic servants
(Subramony 1994), some female agricultural laborers (Mencher 1994), at
least some tribal peoples (Devi 1994; Corrie 1994), migrant workers
from Tamil Nadu, and many head load and other casual labors (Pillai
1992; 1996).10 Extending the Model to these groups becomes increas-
ingly difficult while the other elements of the crisis noted above
continue or worsen.
6.8 Finally, Kerala -- like most places on earth at present -- faces
an environmental crisis of large proportions. Kerala's environmental
damage directly threatens the quality of life and both directly and
indirectly reduces the economic potential that must be tapped to
sustain the main elements of the Model. The best documented component
of Kerala's environmental destruction is the loss of forest cover,
down from 44% in 1905 to 27% in 1965, 17% in 1973, and 10% in 1983
(Kannan and Pushpangadan 1988:A125-126; Chattopadhyay 1985). Loss of
forest cover has resulted in substantial soil erosion and may also
play a role in water logging of lowland areas where drainage is imped-
ed by excess water and soil runoff from higher elevations. Additional
problems include various kinds of water and air pollution, and possi-
ble overfishing of some offshore regions (Kurien 1991). Repairing
environmental damage is among the costliest of human endeavors, adding
difficulty to a stagnant economy with little surplus to invest in
renewal. Kerala's ecological problems are exacerbated by the state's
high population density and its intense land use that make it diffi-
cult to set aside protected areas. Poverty becomes a further source
of pressure on the environment when it reaches certain proportions.
In Kerala, poverty drives settlers onto hillsides too steep for culti-
vation and forces people to cut the dangerously depleted forests for
firewood to sell.
7. The Problem of Sustainability in the Present World Situation
At the beginning of this paper, we asked what forces threaten the
sustainability of the Kerala Model. Clearly, the several components
of the Crisis of the Kerala Model described in section 6 above threa-
ten the model. But outside forces also play roles. Sustaining the
Kerala Model requires surmounting several important national and
international factors.
7.1 The New World Order and Structural Adjustment One of the be-
hind-the-scenes strengths of the Kerala Model has been the limited
power of the state government to align features of the economy with
the demands of the poorest groups. The collapse of the Soviet Union
led to the emergence of an essentially one-power world in the early
1990s. The New World Order threatens even limited local government
powers. Structural adjustment, privatization, downsizing, and asso-
ciated policies will have complex and sometimes unforeseen effects on
Kerala, but a few features of the New World Order seem to be taking
shape: (1) the protectionist policies that helped today's capitalist
economies once develop will be denied to today's underdeveloped na-
tions, (2) public expenditures are considered inefficient and infla-
tionary, and (3) inequality is accepted as a natural result of market
forces and seen as beneficial to development. Without directly saying
so, advocates of the one-power New World Order seem to have accepted
Simon Kuznets' 1955 paper on the need for an entrepreneurial phase of
development in which inequality increases in order to raise produc-
tion, and is followed by a period of increased output, leading to
eventual better lives for all with (relatively) reduced inequality.
Kuznets' scenario takes about 100 years to unfold.11 In the meantime,
India may witness a bifurcation of prosperity in which the upper 10%
of the population enjoys the benefits of liberal investment opportuni-
ties and unrestricted imports while most of the rest of the population
is threatened by diminished benefits and increased insecurity (C. T.
Kurien 1994).
Structural adjustment may be new to India, but its effects in other
parts of the world have already been described. Between 1984 and
1990, average per capita incomes in Africa decreased by 12.5%; in
Latin America they dropped 9.1% (Pinstrup-Anderson 1993:87). Official
poverty levels in Latin America rose from 25% in 1980 to 31% by the
end of the decade (Pinstrup-Anderson 1993:88). In Costa Rica between
1971 and 1983, the poorest 10% of the population lost 20% while the
richest 10% gained 15% relative to prices (Pinstrup-Anderson 1993:88-
89). In Ghana, a long-term trend of falling infant mortality rates
was reversed by a 20% increase from the mid-1970s to mid-1980s (Pin-
strup-Anderson 1993:105); in Abidjan, Ivory Coast neonatal mortality
rates went from 37 per 1,000 in 1977-1981 to 81 per 1,000 in 1982-86
(Pinstrup-Anderson 1993:106). In Brazil, 60,000 "extra" child deaths
are attributed to the 1980s recessions. Brazil had previously been
labeled an economic miracle. The 3rd world generally absorbed more
than 500,000 excess deaths in 1988 alone than might have been expect-
ed. War-related deaths are not included in these estimates (The New
York Times 20 December 1988:1; Grant 1989:1). Despite a long-term
trend of declining child deaths, 13 million children died in 1993, 98%
of them in the 3rd world. At least 8 million of them could have been
saved by oral rehydration therapy, vaccinations, and public health
actions to prevent diseases such as malaria, meningitis, respiratory
ailments, and certain kinds of diarrhea (Brown et al 1993:96). To the
best of our knowledge, no study has yet shown that structural adjust-
ment or any other program of the New World Order has benefited the
poorest groups. Nor has any study shown that the policies of the New
World Order fit logically, theoretically, or empirically with the
concept of sustainability.12
In the context of statistics and trends such as those just noted, we
consider it appropriate -- even essential -- to reassert that, despite
its crisis, the Kerala Model is still valid and relevant as an alter-
native to growth-only development strategies. As the brutality of the
New World Order imposes itself on nations and cultures unprepared or
unable to defend their most vulnerable groups, Kerala, for all its
shortcomings, might become even more of a model.
But only if the Kerala Model survives. Within Kerala, structural
adjustment and related processes threaten to undermine past achieve-
ments, replacing them with policies benefiting only affluent consumers
and freewheeling investors. Fewer restrictions on investment may lead
to more investment going out of the state -- the precise opposite of
what people from all political persuasions seem to think is necessary.
Abolition of subsidy protections to domestic agriculture could under-
mine Kerala's spice, cashew, and other cash crop exchange earnings,
thereby worsening the subsistence base that depends on such earnings.
Protection of small firms may also be lost -- a potentially cata-
strophic blow to an economy with high unemployment in which hundreds
of thousands who are employed work in cottage industries. A market
takeover of health, education, and social welfare could price the poor
out of the process. M. A. Oommen (1994:15) has characterized these
trends as "euthanasia" for the Kerala Model.13
7.2 The International Environmental Crisis and the Problem of Sus-
tainability
Structural adjustment and New World Order domination are not the
only perils to the sustainability of the Kerala Model. International
environmental developments also pose serious hazards of unpredictable
nature and scope. The 20th century has generated so much output that
numerous "sustainable yield thresholds of natural systems" (Brown
1995:4) have been crossed. At current and likely future levels of
abuse, any area can be affected by another area's practices. Forest
cover, topsoil, rangelands, and 13 of the world's 15 main oceanic
fisheries are in decline. Fresh water tables are dropping all over
the world. International grain stocks are expected to decline for the
3rd consecutive year, to as low as 49 days -- the lowest level record-
ed since the system was set up (Brown 1995:6-8). Declines in area
planted and fertilizer use have combined with stagnation in irrigation
water to threaten an impending food crisis. Worldwide, grain prices
in 1995 rose by one-third (Brown 1995:8-9). Atmospheric warming from
massive developed country carbon emissions -- with the U.S. in a
faraway first place and one of the highest growth rates as well -- has
probably brought on local weather changes all over the world.14 High
winds, floods, droughts, and other weather extremes may be harming
food production and threatening lives in many areas.
Kerala could well be influenced by international grain decline, fish
catch losses, and climate irregularities. With no direct bargaining
power in international forums, and dependent on India's influence,
which seems limited vis a vis the U.S. and other rich countries, in
the short run, Kerala can only try to react locally to the several
world-system ecological sustainability wildcards.
8. So Is the Kerala Model Sustainable?
The answer to the question requires drawing up a balance sheet with
Kerala's internal shortcomings along with the worldwide threats.
Against these we must weigh Kerala's traditional and current resourc-
es. No simple numerical outcome is possible. What are Kerala's
strengths in the current situation?
8.1 The old Kerala model still matters.
The old Kerala Model fostered a literate, fairly healthy, motivated
population with a sense of purpose, involvement, commitment to ideals,
and a generally optimistic orientation to the future. These achieve-
ments -- along with the expectation of high material quality of life
indicators and willingness to organize and carry out mass actions --
give Kerala weapons with which to build a new model appropriate to
today's circumstances.
Let us return briefly to Nadur Village, where we studied redistribu-
tion. In 1971 Joan Mencher found that only 25% of sample respondents
believed that the village "had made progress." Following the several
radical reforms, we found in 1987, that 59% believed their lives were
better than those of their parents, and 71% thought life for their
children would be even better (Franke 1993:273). Several respondents
volunteered observations about the important role of community actions
in making life better. Eight years later, Isaac and Tharakan
(1995:1997) summarized a major finding of the First International
Congress on Kerala Studies with their observation that "It is the
consciousness and struggles of the masses and not the manipulations of
the politicians that will ultimately determine" whether the Kerala
Model survives and is renewed. To the extent that the consciousness
and struggles of the masses have set Kerala apart from most of the
rest of India, the old Kerala model still matters.
Redistribution still matters too. A study by Cereseto and Waitzkin
(1988) found that for any given level of average per capita income,
countries with more equality provided better education, longer life,
and lower infant mortality. In other words, the Kerala Model holds
cross-culturally. But does redistribution work at cross-purposes to
production? More recently, economists Bowles, Gordon, and Weisskopf
(1990:223) found that among advanced industrial countries,both produc-
tivity growth and investment performance are strongly and positively
correlated with equality. The New York Times (8 January 1994:A39)
reported that "many economists..[have] begun to see greater income
equality as compatible with faster growth -- and perhaps even contrib-
uting to it." And the US magazine, Business Week, led its issue of 15
August 1994 with a story entitled "Inequality: How the growing gap
between rich and poor in America is hurting the economy." Among the
studies cited in the article was one showing that in 26 US cities,
those with the least inequality between suburban and inner city in-
comes job creation was significantly greater than those with greater
inequality. Another study cited was a summary of 54 other studies
from which the Author, Harvard economist Richard B. Freeman, argued
that market strategies and privatization tend to raise inequality
while government programs are essential to reducing it.
The exact mechanisms leading to the correlations between equality,
productivity, investment performance, and job creation, are not
spelled out in these reports, but surely they deserve closer atten-
tion. Taken together, they imply that Kerala's strategy of redistri-
bution is not the likely cause of the state's high unemployment and
sluggish economic growth. To the contrary, they imply that the Kerala
Model is valid and relevant as an alternative to development strate-
gies emphasizing growth by means of or along with increasing inequali-
ty. The gains made in Nadur -- that we cited earlier -- may be a less
an outmoded left wing chimera and more a reasonable basis from which
to launch sustainable development.
How will this sustainable development come about? In their review
of the discussions at the First International Congress on Kerala
Studies, Isaac and Tharakan (1995:1997) pointed out that "...the Left
needs to draw up a new agenda that is more responsive to the changed
reality of contemporary Kerala." At the same Congress, veteran CPM
leader E. M. S. Namboodiripad pointed out the need to "accelerate
economic growth without sacrificing the welfare gains and the demo-
cratic achievements of the past" (Isaac and Tharakan 1995:1997).
Without jettisoning past achievements, the left today proposes a set
of initiatives that, in our view, constitute reasonable extensions of
the left programs of the past, that seem to offer possible solutions
to past shortcomings of the Kerala Model, and that create at least the
initial elements of a type of sustainability that has a real chance to
succeed.
The programs to which we refer are currently underway, so we cannot
evaluate them empirically. But we can consider their main features
and offer reasons why they might work, based on the points made in
earlier sections of this paper.
The Left's "new agenda" is the People's Campaign for the Ninth Plan.
This campaign seems to have been drawn up on the basis of the discus-
sions at the First International Congress on Kerala Studies and dis-
cussions at several follow-up conferences in 1994 and 1995. It is
also based in part on the New Democratic Initiatives of the 1987-91
LDF Ministry. These included the elected district councils -- which
are being brought back to life for the new campaign -- the Total
Literacy Programme, the installation of high-efficiency chulahs,
limited unrestricted funds to local panchayats, and the People's
Resource Mapping Programme. Each of these programs had met with
modest success in producing their desired outcomes. The Congress-led
UDF victory in the 1991 elections brought the programs to a near halt
(except for the panchayat unrestricted funds), but forces had been set
in motion that could be reactivated after the LDF election success of
April 1996: the New Democratic Initiatives had mobilized many activ-
ists and had given them experience, and LDF leaders and middle level
cadre may have learned lessons about the potential for grassroots
development action aimed more at community integration and increasing
production than at class struggle to spread existing wealth.15
The current campaign apparently aims at giving panchayats and urban
communities local control over about 35-40% of the development budget.
Prior to taking this control, however, they will participate in what
seems to be a massive educational and discussion program to help them
make informed choices. The education program involves training of 400
state level instructors from among the most educated groups with
experience in organizing, 6,000 district level instructors, and 50,000
local level facilitators (Namboodiripad 1996; GOK 1996, 1996a). The
content of the training includes skills from resource mapping knowl-
edge of KSSP environmental publications to cost-benefit analysis to
how to lead a meeting. Plans call for an attempt at one-third female
representation in the leadership, along with special attention to
mobilizing Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe activists as well.
Training of facilitators is to be followed by local seminars leading
to the creation of local task forces that can develop proposals to
raise production while maintaining the environmental base of the
community. To involve the largest number of people, the campaign
envisions mass meetings only on holidays. Printed invitations with
agendas are to be delivered to every house, jathas, padayatras, street
theater, and other KSSP-like activities are to be utilized, and a
development quiz is to be organized in every school (GOK 1996).
The People's Campaign for the 9th Plan appears to be a giant com-
posite of the earlier New Democratic Initiatives. At least on paper,
it is an integrated program to foster an unusually high degree of
interaction between government and ordinary people with a focus on the
particular issues that make up the crisis of the Kerala Model. As
such, it also becomes a conscious, organized attempt both to keep the
Kerala Model alive, and to throw up shields of resistance against the
most harmful elements of the New World Order. To the best of our
knowledge, Kerala is one of the very few places in the world at pres-
ent with such a massive, organized, conscious campaign aimed at an
alternative to market-only development. Can it succeed? Should it?
Based on the earlier sections of this paper, we offer the following
tentative assessment of and questions about the People's Campaign as
it appears in its documents. First, let us consider the apparent
negative elements.
1. The Campaign will only help Kerala's people and succeed in its own
terms if it leads to increases in agricultural and industrial produc-
tion and productivity. It is not clear from the planning documents
whether a strategy for evaluation of these crucial outcomes has been
prepared.
2. The Campaign does not clearly protect agricultural labor pensions,
fair price shops, and health and education spending that are all
necessary to maintaining the quality of life indicators of the Kerala
Model.
3. The Campaign seems to follow a logical process in extending the
earlier Kerala Model. Redistribution of wealth is being followed by
and supplemented by redistribution of power. Kerala's earlier mass
movements could thus be reinvigorated and redirected.
4. Better use of local resources might ease Kerala's unemployment
crisis if the local development plans can be made labor-intensive.16
5. Local self-sufficiency to a reasonable extent may be a smart sur-
vival tactic in a world of unpredictable climate change and possibly
erratic grain prices.
6. Local self-sufficiency (to a reasonable extent) could provide a
shield against some elements of structural adjustment.
7. Local, democratically planned development is less likely to lead to
extreme forms of inequality than the market would inevitably otherwise
encourage. People who work together to create their panchayat or
urban district development plan are less likely to accept exploitative
economic relationships with each other.
8. Participation in meaningful democratic development planning and
actions could conjure up a new generation of Kerala activists.
Is the Kerala Model sustainable? As we noted earlier, Oommen has
argued convincingly that unchecked penetration by the forces of the
New World Order will mean an answer of "no." An attempt by left
forces in Kerala to simply continue the old Kerala Model will probably
also mean an answer of "no." But perhaps the forces that created the
old Kerala Model can be reinvigorated and can be directed into a new
model in which the shortcomings of the old are addressed. And if
sustainability becomes a conscious part of the New Kerala Model and a
conscious element of planning and thinking throughout the society,
they might just have a chance for success. In a world needing every
possible experiment in sustainability, we all stand to benefit from
their attempt.
Notes
1. A subject search of the Harvard University library Union
Catalog brought up 180 books with (nonmilitary) "sustainability"
as one of the key words. Most were published since 1993.
2. These are adapted from Franke and Chasin 1983:11. Daly
(1996:195) gives more detailed and technical definition: "An
economy in sustainable development adapts and improves in knowl-
edge, organization, technical efficiency, and wisdom; it does this
without assimilating or accreting an ever greater percentage of
the matter-energy of the ecosystem into itself but rather stops at
a scale at which the remaining ecosystem can continue to function
and renew itself year after year. The nongrowing economy is not
static -- it is being continually maintained and renewed as a
steady-state subsystem of the environment." Daly goes on to
specify how particular elements of the economy should operate,
but does not directly take up the questions of distribution of
wealth, political rights, and material levels of living.
3. See Franke 1993, chapter 7, pp. 121-192 or Franke 1992 for
details of the analysis of the land reform that follows.
4. Isaac and Tharakan (1995:1996) see this conflict as a possible
reason for the heavy election losses of the LDF in 1978 in Palak-
kad and Alappuzha, two of its traditional strongholds. Herring
(1989, 1991) surveys many aspects of the conflict with particular
reference to Palakkad.
5. Jeffrey (1993) appears to agree with this point, though his
explanation for how the movements grew differs somewhat from
ours. Casinader (1995) offers a view similar to ours in the
context of a comparison between Kerala and Sri Lanka. Herring
(1983) argues that mass movements and their level of militancy
were the keys to the enactment of the Kerala land reform.
6. See also Franke 1993:19-21 where the overview cites Cohn
1971, Fuller 1976, and Mencher 1966. The recent study by T. T.
Sreekumar 1993 adds new dimensions to the discussion.
7. Beedi production in northern Malabar is otherwise difficult to
account for since none of the raw materials are available there.
8. Robin Jeffrey (1993) has suggested that the decline of the
marumakkathayam system and the breakup of the Nair taravad
may also have played a role. His point is well argued, but we
think larger forces also had to be at work. For one thing, Nairs
make up only about 14% of Kerala's population, and while many
Ezhava households also practice marumakkathayam, this hardly
seems enough to produce such widespread class mobilization as
occurred in 20th century Kerala.
9. The 1995 State Planning Board report (GOK 1995:26-28) does
not give a final figure for rice distribution for 1994, but the
figures for the first 10 months indicate a drop of 29% (computed
from GOK 1995:28). An increase in the amount of wheat of about
20% may offset some of the rice losses.
10. Pillai (1996:2099) reported that about 4,600 headload workers
are covered by a Kerala-Model type scheme to regularize their
work relations and create a modern benefit structure. The 4,600
workers appear to represent only about 2% of the total estimated
headload and casual laborers in the state.
11. Franke (1993:9-10) summarizes and documents the Kuznets
approach that still seems to lie at the basis of capitalist thinking
about development.
12. A full-scale attack from almost every angle appears in Mander
and Goldsmith, ed. (1996).
13. The other elements mentioned in the paragraph are also taken
from his paper.
14. US emissions in 1994 were 1.4 billion tons, almost double those
of second place China with 835 million. Per person emissions in
the US were 5.3 tons, also a first place rating (Flavin 1995:30).
15. Tornquist (1995) has produced a critical overall assessment of
the New Democratic Initiatives. Although his criticisms have
apparently been considered too harsh by some LDF activists, the
foreign reader is likely to be struck just as much by the evidence
he presents of LDF leaders and middle cadre able to engage in
rather impressive analysis and criticism of their own programs.
16. Kalliasseri Panchayat's experience in reducing seasonal unem-
ployment with a dry-season vegetable garden project sugggests
grounds for optimism in this regard. In the dry season of 1993,
21 cooperative groups of unemployed youth got medium harvests
and broke even on their investments. A total of 2,500 unem-
ployed got work experience and pay. More than 6 acres became
productive in a new way (Gangadharan 1993).
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Asian Studies, Report Series, No. 24.
This book also appears serialized in Economic and Political Weekly
31(28):1847-1858, 31(29):1953-1973, and 31(
Ukkuru, Mary P., Jyothi Augustine, Prema L., and Sujatha A. 1994.
Working pattern and nutritional profiles of women engaged in stone
breaking. Paper presented at the First International Congress on
Kerala Studies. Thiruvananthapuram, 27-29 August 1994.
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